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Over the past few decades, academic literature, specifically on agency theory and executive 
compensation, has argued that CEO compensation should be aligned to firm performance in 
order to increase shareholder value. 
Nevertheless, some studies present the contrary idea, in which no link between performance 
and compensation can be established. 
This thesis analyses the relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation 
regarding Portuguese listed firms in the period of 2008-2013. No statistical evidence was 
found linking firm performance and CEO compensation, even after introducing governance 
and financial control variables as well as performing small sampling analysis of the top 
performers. 
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Over the past few decades, academic literature, specifically on agency theory and executive 
compensation, has argued that CEO compensation should be aligned to firm performance in 
order to increase shareholder value (e.g. Jensen and Meckling (1976), Banker and Datar 
(1989), Hall and Liebman (1998), Core, Guay and Larcker (2003), among others). 
Nevertheless, some studies present the contrary idea, in which no link between performance 
and compensation can be established (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). This is due essentially 
to 4 main reasons:  
1) executive pay is too high;  
2) CEO contracts do not provide enough incentives (too little pay for performance);  
3) Options and other equity-based pay provide “windfalls”; 
4) CEOs have too much freedom to unwind their incentives. 
In Portugal, following several recent scandals of the CEO power over the board, firm 
bankruptcy and questioning over if pay for performance is not only a buzzword, some codes 
and laws have been put in place regarding corporate governance, some EU directives adopted 
and creation of laws mandating the specification of compensation packages, among others. 
Moreover, new controls, mechanism of checks and balances and information transparency 
guidelines have been adopted recognizing the inherent value they bring to each firm.  
One must ask if any of the 4 conclusions from Bebchuk and Fried (2004) is applicable to the 
Portuguese case. Is pay without performance evidenced in Portuguese listed firms?  
At first glance, looking at the topic from this perspective (decoupling performance and 
compensation) and assuming it is a valid proposition, the conclusions might derive from: 
 Performance incentives are not indexed to total CEO pay (e.g. in Portugal fixed salary 
component is commonly used as total CEO pay) and, therefore, firm performance is 
independent from CEO pay; 
 Contracts are inefficient, as they do not incorporate enough risk-taking mechanisms 
to boost performance (e.g. incentives are not linked with risk taking decisions that act 
as a way to reward CEO when firm performance is good (carrot) but do not act like 
the stick when firm performance is bad); 
CEO COMPENSATION AS A MECHANISM TO INDUCE FIRM PERFORMANCE 
2 
 
 Risk aversion is a common trait, from CEOs to shareholders, which influences 
performance and therefore total CEO pay; 
The main purpose of this thesis is to examine whether total compensation paid to CEOs in 
Portuguese firms explains firm performance and whether the perspective of pay without 
performance is not valid. 
Two hypotheses are constructed around the concept of pay for performance: 
 The first hypothesis aims to test if there might be a statistically significant relationship 
between firm performance and CEO compensation; 
 Additionally, if there is a statistically significant relationship, it is intended to further 
test the following additional hypothesis: the higher the weight of the variable parcel in 
total compensation earned by the CEO, the better the firm’s performance. 












The CFA Institute (2012) defines Corporate Governance as “(…) the system of principles, 
policies, procedures, and clearly defined responsibilities and accountabilities used by 
stakeholders to overcome the conflicts of interest inherent in the corporate form”.  
According to the OECD (1999), on the other hand, Corporate Governance addresses the 
creation of relationships between management, the board, the shareholders and other 
stakeholders and provides the structure through which the objectives are defined for the 
company as well as the means for their reach. Additionally, Corporate Governance should 
also develop incentives and an effective model and method for monitoring those relations as 
well as also encouraging firms to use their resources more efficiently. 
Therefore, Corporate Governance, is the means through which different stakeholders connect 
to the firm. 
This topic, as well as the topic of roles separation between shareholders and managers goes 
back to the twentieth decade in the XX century. In 1932, Berle and Means, casted light on the 
growing trend of roles separation between management and shareholders in listed firms, due 
to the fact that, as the role of the shareholder became more disperse and vast, more intense 
was the need for specific management roles. About 40 years later, Mace’s work (1971), 
highlighted the misalignment between shareholders expectations versus management roles 
regarding goal definition as well as strategy and politics for the firm.  
Corporate Governance is a multifaceted and vast theme (between performance, compliance, 
compensation, …) where there is no shortage of topics to address. As such, it is acceptable 
that literature is also wide and vast. For the purpose and scope of this thesis I have compiled 
the relevant literature from a number of authors throughout the XX and XXI centuries, in a 
number of countries that will try to summarize Corporate Governance main topics, which will 
be presented onward. 




Figure 1 – Relevant themes in Corporate Governance 
In the 80s decade of the XX century, the relevant research came from Baysinger and Butler 
(1985) narrating the effects on firm performance given changes on board composition as well 
as the work from Mintzeberg (1984) regarding the aspect of firm ownership.  
In the 90s, one of the highlights was the extremely relevant work summarized in the Cadbury 
Report (1992) regarding the role of non-executive directors as well as the check and balance 
mechanisms necessary to mitigate abuse of power as well as protect shareholder rights. In this 
report, it was recommended the widespread presence of non-executive directors in the firm´s 
committees, the creation of several committees (in particular the audit, nomination and 
compensation committees) and implementation of split responsibilities between chairman and 
CEO. 
Specifically regarding compensation, one must emphasize the work from Sir Richard 
Greenbury (1995), which called out the need for full disclosure of paid compensation as well 
as sector independent best practice codes. Additionally, the report also stated the necessity for 
compensation committees to incorporate non-executive directors in order to achieve greater 
control on compensation packages (the board recommendation making mechanism).  
The Turnbull Report (1999) is another milestone for Corporate Governance, specifically 
regarding the introduction of internal control mechanisms and their reporting standards on 
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In the beginning of the XXI century, Sarbannes-Oxley (2002) brought to the table additional 
control procedures regarding the check and balance mechanisms and internal controls with the 
ultimate goal of achieving power segregation and bigger transparency on financial reporting. 
The UK Combined Code (2003), also in the beginning of the century, compiled a list of 
recommendations and principles regarding independence, diligence, professional 
development and board evaluation. 
In Portugal, the first highlights are the recommendations of the CMVM – Comissão de 
Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (1999 and 2003) as well as the White Book of Corporate 
Governance by the Instituto de Corporate Governance (2006). 
Regarding Portuguese law, two codes, “Sociedades Comerciais” and “Valores Mobiliários” 
present a set of rules regarding firm management, shareholder rights and information duties 
which address some relevant Corporate Governance areas. 
Additionally, specifically for listed firms, the “Código de Governo das Sociedades” (2007, 
rev. 2010) and CMVM Rule n.º1/2010 also apply.  
In 2014 the “Código de Governo das Sociedades” was introduced by the Instituto Português 
de Corporate Governance, which as it itself describes “embodies, as a means of promoting 
good corporate governance practices, the civil society response to the call of national 
companies and a broad community of stakeholders on matters of corporate governance that, 
in these areas, Portugal approached the international standard of self-regulation.. 
In this context, the Portuguese Institute of Corporate Governance is committed to designing 
an alternative to the current striking feature, based on the centrality of the regulator in the 
production process of recommendations. and makes available to all companies an alternative 
to the CMVM Code, being its natural recipients, primarily, listed firms, particularly issuers 
admitted to trading on a regulated market. Founded on the rule of "comply or explain", the 
Code aims to ensure IPCG easier firm compliance and meet the difficult goal of making it 
very adaptable to heterogeneous realities of its recipients
12
.” 
                                                     
1
 Translated from Portuguese by the thesis author. 
2
 As described on IPCG website - 
http://www.cgov.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=773&Itemid=1 (25-08-2014). 
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There are several developed codes throughout the world, which some have only been 
presented here. This is, naturally, not an exhaustive list. It only intends to present a part of the 
history developed so far from several studies and codes.  
Regarding the several aspects of the relationship with stakeholders there are several theories 
and hypothesis.  
Onward, I will be presenting the most relevant theories in the context of Corporate 
Governance with a bigger focus on Agency Theory, given its relevance for the thesis. 
In summary, all the theories can be organized under different perspectives: 













(…) (…) (…) Stakeholder Theory 
(…)    (…) 
 
Table 1 – Framework of different theories under several perspectives  
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
On this chapter it will be presented a set of theories that address and contextualize Corporate 
Governance and the compensation theme, specifically, as well as firm performance and 
measurement variables.  
3.2. GENERAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE THEORIES 
3.2.1 AGENCY THEORY 
According to Smith (1776), Berle and Means (1932) or most recently Helm (1989), by the 
action of hedging investment risk, firm growth and management professionalization there is a 
progressive trend of role specialization between shareholders and firm managers. These 
reasons present coordination problems and enforces the creation of a number of incentives 
and a monitoring model for the action/decisions taken by the manager in order to guarantee 
their alignment with the interests of the shareholders (what is known as the agency dilemma). 
One of the main theories to address the agency dilemma, the ability to monitor 
actions/decisions taken by the manager and the creation of incentives in order to align 
manager interests with the shareholder rights and maximization of firm value is the Agency 
Theory, written by Jensen and Mecking in 1976. This theory is both framed within Corporate 
Governance and Corporate Finance. 
The theory was lately developed by other authors such as Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen 
(1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jensen (1986) and Williamson (1988). 
The agency theory is built upon the premise that the separation between management 
(executed by managers) and firm control (assets owned by the shareholders) impacts the 
relationship between these two roles, which is then characterized by being an agency 
relationship, given that the principal hires the agent in which he delegates the firms decisions. 
Given that both roles are utility function maximizers this can lead to different goals, many of 
which are contradictory. 
The rationale behind this concept is that it is plausible that managers/agents might not always 
perform/act in the shareholders/principals best interest. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that it is virtually impossible that the agent always acts, in 
any given time or decision made, in the shareholders best interest. 




Figure 2 – Principal-agent relationship 
The figure above is described as “The governance relationship”, adapted from “Corporate 
Governance Principles, Policies and Practices” by Bob Tricker, and provides a full insight 
over the principal and agent relationship. 
The main factors that limit the ability to align shareholder and managers interests, among 
several others, are the ones which build up monitoring costs for performance control, namely: 
i) Information asymmetry; 
ii) Complexity of decisions;  
iii) Difficulty of establishing objective criteria for evaluating agent performance. 
It is also important, to clearly define, what an agency relationship is. What this means is that 
we are in the presence of an agency relationship when 2 main conditions are fulfilled: 
 The relationship between principal and the agent is based on a contract established on 
which the principal delegates/authorizes the agent to manage its assets; 
 This relationship can be set between numerous interlocutors, i.e., there may be only 2 
parties (one principal and one agent) – the simplest case - or a ratio of n to n 
interlocutors (more complex cases, e.g. limited liability firms); 
Therefore, the greater the number of participants, the more complex the agency relationship 
becomes, given the heterogeneity of preferences and goals of several different principals and 
agents. 
As a result of the existence of this contract between principal and agent, the existing 
information asymmetry between them and the conflicts of interest (as previously mentioned) a 
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i) Monitoring costs, including all costs incurred by the principal to control the agent's 
behaviour (e.g. audits, contract termination costs, ...).; 
ii) Cost of commitment/relationship, i.e., all costs that objectify the fulfilment of 
expectations of principal and ensure greater transparency of information (e.g. 
information disclosure, investor relations function on the firm, ...).; 
iii) Residual loss, mostly residual costs of non-alignment of interests between 
managers and shareholders (conflicts of interest). 
Sources of agency conflicts 
Also according to the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976), there are a number of sources of 
conflict between principal/shareholder and agent/manager. It is important to detail these in 
order to understand the impact of those on the relationship established between them: 
 Moral hazard: related to the asymmetric information between the parties, it is a 
concept inherent to any kind of agreement between two (or more) parties. 
Corresponding to the change of behaviour by one (or more) of the parties, it is 
contrary to the expected result of the agreement, in order to obtain a certain 
advantage. (e.g. investment decisions for managing assets that promote the lock-in of 
the current management due to the specific knowledge about them, ...); 
 Earnings smoothing, i.e., through the manipulation of cash flows in order to improve 
bonus or compensation payments or to make it easy to achieve results in not so 
favourable years; 
 Earnings retention: by making discretionary decisions favouring investment by 
substitution of dividends; 
 Risk aversion, via making funding decisions that minimize risk and, as such, penalize 
the performance and/or the value of the company. Might be indirectly linked to the 
remuneration package of managers and, therefore, decisions with less risk do not 
compromise the remuneration package of managers. 
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Agency theory criticism 
According to Bob Tricker – Corporate Governance (2009), the main criticisms facing the 
agency theory may fall into 4 categories: 
 The theory presents a reduced scope of theoretical analysis, since it only studies the 
scope of the contractual relationship between the principal and the agent and does not 
contemplate a "set of group dynamics, personal behaviour and political games" that 
should also be addressed; 
 Muth and Donaldson (1997) say that there is a direct positive relationship between the 
degree of compliance and governance performance; 
 Other critics consider the basic assumption is simplistic and general, presenting 
relevant examples, such as fund involvement as shareholders of firms or 
conglomerates, where managers are unaware of who is the shareholder; 
 Philosophically speaking, since the intrinsic nature of man cherishes selfishness and 
not selflessness, the argument focuses precisely in the impossibility of fully ensure 
the best interests of shareholders. 
Mechanisms for controlling the agency problem  
Minimizing the agency problem can only present superior and consistent effects through an 
integrated approach that includes three vectors (Matos, 2009): 
i) Clear definition of the goals to be achieved by the manager, all previously known; 
ii) Keeping the shareholder informed allowing it to monitor the status of how goals 
will be/are being pursuit; 
iii) Creating incentives that bring together the interests of the agent and principal, 
including the value and form of remuneration. 
Besanko, Dranove and Shanley (1996) refer that, only via hiring - where the agent gets paid 
by the principal for its services, associated, for example, with obtaining successful results 
against the defined goals - it is guaranteed that the main objective of the shareholder (the 
maximization of their wealth), is likely to be aligned with agent behaviours. 
The design of efficient contracts should always be safeguarded by three cumulative 
conditions:  
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i) A priori, no withholding of any information by the agent always allowing the 
principal to know the actions to be taken and the expected results; 
ii) A posteriori, visibility and tangibility about the results of decisions taken by the 
principal; 
iii) As a result of the actions described above, implemented mechanisms for reducing 
risk for agents in order to achieve the agreed remuneration.  
However, it appears to be common place the existence of incomplete contracts in which, in 
turn, the principal requires the payment of premiums since there is not a full alignment 
between the agent's actions and the former’s expectation of wealth maximization. 
Additionally, given the difficulty of measuring performance (since some goals set in the 
contract may not be directly and easily measurable and, when it is possible to measure the 
performance it can also be a function of exogenous factors and, therefore, possible to be 
influenced) this becomes another reason for the premiums collection by the principal. 
Moreover, given the risks presented previously (e.g. asymmetric information, moral hazard, 
...) that might maximize changes in the agent's behaviour against the one desired by the 
principal, it becomes necessary to increase the level of information and observability of the 
relationship between them (e.g. using clear, known and shared objectives by both, properly 
safeguard a wide view over the target, its mechanism of evaluation and measurement form or 
by increasing the fairness of the vote to the agent). 
The issue of executive compensation will be extensively examined later in this thesis. 
3.2.2 TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
Coase (1937) - The Nature of the Firm, refers that the firms can reduce costs internalizing 
activities rather than outsource them. However, as businesses grow the decision to internalize 
changes in favour of outsourcing. Williamson (1975 and 1988), argues that it is possible to 
overcome diseconomies of scale through the choice of governance structures that are 
favourable to the firm. Thus, this theory focuses on governance structures and the cost of the 
mechanisms of checks and balances. It argues that these costs must be incurred until a 
moment when total costs are equal to the reduction of potential loss due to non-compliance. 
According to Bob Tricker – Corporate Governance (2009), although in this theory it is 
considered that the individualistic behaviour of Top Management is equal to the agency 
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theory, the "focus concerns the governance structures and mechanisms of check and balances 
as opposed to the Agency Theory which sees the company as a set of contracts ". 
3.2.3. STEWARDSHIP THEORY 
In the particular case of the Stewardship Theory, it focuses on the legal relationship between 
the company and the relationship between the shareholder and manager. According to Barn 
and Hesterly (2008), it theorizes that managers will act as guardians of the assets they 
manage. This theory is an alternative view to the Agency Theory, in that it first assumes that 
managers will not act altruistically (but in their own interest) at the expense of shareholders. 
Thus, managers are nominated and elected by the shareholder, the former having a fiduciary 
duty to protect the interests of the latter. This is a classic view of Corporate Governance, since 
it assumes that managers are reliable from the shareholder’s point of view. 
In Agency Theory, contrary to the assumption of altruism of the Stewardship Theory, a set of 
mechanisms that reduce the loss of agency are specified, including executive compensation 
and benefits as well as incentive schemes for managers. According to Donaldson and Davis 
(1991) this can be achieved by financial rewards or by stock that align the financial interests 
of executives with the ones of the shareholders in order to motivate them for improving 
business performance  
3.2.4. RESOURCE DEPENDENCY THEORY 
 
This theory was formalized in 1970 with the publication of the book "The External Control of 
Organizations: A Resource Dependence perspective (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978)." 
Several other authors have studied and developed this theory, namely Salancik (1979), Boyd 
(1990), Hayward and Boeker (1998), Pfeffer,(1982), Scott (2003). 
The Resource Dependency Theory studies how external resources of organizations affect the 
behaviour of the organization. From the point of view of this theory, capturing external 
funding plays a vital role in strategic and tactical management for any business. In the view of 
Resource Dependency Theory, attracting external resources has direct implications on the 
firms on a number of levels (e.g. from production strategies to the recruitment of employees 
across the supply chain and with impact on the internal organizational alignment).  
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The theory’s postulate can be summarized as follows:  
 Organizations rely on internal and external resources, which are originated from the 
environment around an organization. The environment may contain other 
organizations; 
 Resources are a necessity for organizations and are scarce. These are often entrenched 
in other organizations; 
 Influence and resource dependence are directly linked. The influence of an 
organization A over the organization B is based on the degree of dependence on 
resources provided by the organization B to the organization A. The more dependent 
A is over B the larger the power of B over A is; 
 Influence is therefore relational, situational and potentially mutual. 
Corporate Governance is, therefore, the pendulum on which managers are organized as 
contact points between organizations and their decisions. 
Recently, Resource Dependency Theory has been under increased scrutiny from several 
studies (e.g. Hillman et al (2009), Davis and Cobb (2010), Drees & Heugens (2013), Sharif 
and Yeoh (2014)). All of these studies discuss the importance of this theory to explain the 
decisions taken by organizations, through the formation of networks, alliances, joint ventures, 
mergers and acquisitions, on which organizations seek to minimize/overcome addictions and 
improve their autonomy (e.g. vertical integration, ...). Although the resource dependence 
theory is within the scope of theories that characterize organizational behaviour, it is not a 
theory that explains performance.  
3.2.5. SYSTEMS THEORY 
Systems Theory postulates that the various perspectives described above do not represent a 
complete picture and are, therefore, limited in scope of analysis and in the vision they 
translate. This complete picture, the theory argues, is only achieved through an integrated 
view of the phenomenon, interpreting and classifying it as a hierarchy of systems. This theory 
uses three criteria to identify a system: 
 The limits of the system (the central system and its environment) in order to consider 
what belongs to it and what belongs to the environment; 
 The system’s abstraction level (perception and detail); 
 The purpose of the system (what occurs between inputs and outputs). 
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In the specific case of Corporate Governance, there is no academic consensus on what are the 
limits of the system based on the extensive literature reviewed. As Bob Tricker – Corporate 
Governance (2009) indicates, there are different views on what is the scope of Corporate 
Governance (principles and best practices versus relations between shareholders and firms - 
exercise of power versus the company as a promoter of social responsibility vehicle). Thus, it 
is difficult to construct a theory relating to Corporate Governance systems that can be general 
enough to encompass all possible perspectives through observation of the phenomenon and 
explaining it through its decomposition and classification.  
As Bob Tricker – Corporate Governance (2009) points out “The creation of a general theory 
of Corporate Governance is certainly premature and probably over-optimistic…”. 
 
3.3. COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES THEORIES 
According to Geiler and Renneboog (2011), the biggest issue on executive compensation 
focuses on its ability to stimulate the rational decisions of managers towards maximizing the 
value of the company while simultaneously preventing the excessively withdrawal of income 
from the firm. 
Underlying this idea is the principle of pay for performance, i.e., indexing the income earning 
by the manager to the company's performance. Logically, this component is not included in 
the fixed component of the overall compensation. 
Given the shareholder structure, Holderness and Sheehan (1988) discovered that CEOs who 
are majority shareholders in listed firms are compensated with higher salaries than other non-
majority shareholders CEO. Along with this rationale, Allen (1981) also concluded that the 
level of CEO compensation is a decreasing function of the percentage of equity held by the 
CEO (and his family). Additionally, Lambert et al. (1993) found evidence that CEO 
compensation is comparably less when there is a member of the board with a percentage 
higher than 5% in equity, than in the other cases. 
Also Core (1997), reports that CEO compensation increases when the control of voting rights 
is greater and is lower with share value reduction. 
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Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1998), found empirical evidence testing the agency model and 
report that the level of compensation is an increasing positive function of the level of 
performance of the firms.  
Following the concept of optimal contracting by Core, Guay and Larcker (1999), the 
compensation poured on an optimal contract should be the one that maximizes the net 
economic value of the company after the cost of transactions and payments to employees, i.e., 
when hiring minimizes agency costs. However, it is necessary to distinguish between "optimal 
contracting" versus "perfect hiring", according to Jensen and Meckling (1975), where optimal 
is the "first best efficient", contrarily to the theoretical lack of restrictions of a perfect hire. 
Independently of the level of compensation, when typically hiring, crossing the variable time 
period with the nature of component it will be possible to fit a set of compensation types that 
compose the overall compensation of the manager. According to Cadman et all (2009), firms 






 Fixed salary 
 Current expense (ex. Credit card, 
health insurance, life insurance, ) 
 (…) 
 Annual bonus 
 (…) 
Long term N/A 
 Stock options 
 Long Term Incentive Plans 
 Restricted Stock 
 Supplemental Executive 
Retirement 
 Severance Pay/ Golden Parachutes 
 Deferred bonus 
 (…) 
Table 2 – Compensation framework according to time and nature 
 
The short-term component of a manager’s compensation is the sum of his base salary with 
current expenses and the annual bonus depending on achieving annual goals defined by 
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previously established metrics (e.g. financial indicators -. EBITDA, ... - or operational 
indicators) . 
Typically, the base salary is set by the remuneration committee with reference to the seniority, 
experience, goals and benchmarks. Murphy (1999) found a strong statistical relationship 
between base salary and company size.  
Note that, according to Conyon and Murphy (2000) the overall salary as a percentage of the 
overall remuneration package presents a downward trend which shows managers are 
increasingly more prone to comply with the will of the shareholder (complying with the 
principle of pay for performance). 
The long-term component includes the use of a broader set of instruments that define various 
compensation alternatives. In addition, as mentioned by Frydman and Saks (2007) the weight 
of this component in overall total compensation has increased over years. 
Although they belong to the long-term component, each tool serves a different purpose, 
namely: 
 Stock options: An instrument that gives the buyer the right but not the obligation, to 
buy (call) or sell (put) a share at an agreed price within a certain period or on a 
specific date. The aim is to create shareholder value through the decision to make 
investments with a higher degree of risk; 
 Restricted stock: firm stock that is not fully transferable until certain conditions 
(vesting) have been met. These are used as a means of maintaining the manager over 
a given time period or until a set of goals is achieved. 
 Long-term Incentive Plans (LTIPs): incentive programs that offer potential 
significant premium in addition to the base Salary and annual bonus, covering 
periods exceeding one year performance. This component presents two sub-
categories, i) multi-annual plans, with a fixed period of three to five years and ii) 
based on career plans where benefits are accumulated throughout the professional 
career and paid on retirement. 
 Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs): retirement plans (usually not 
discriminated in yearly management reports), which is a mechanism to serve the 
purpose of increasing job security for taking decisions with a higher degree of risk. 
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 Golden Parachutes: similar to the SERPs purpose, ensure the incentive for risk-
taking in order to maximize the company's value. 
Mechanisms for setting CEO compensation 
Following best practices, according to Bob Tricker – Corporate Governance (2009) and the 
Greenbury Report (1995), the remuneration committee should be the one to set the 
compensation package for the manager. This committee should be composed mainly of 
independent directors and must have a proactive role in making recommendations to the 
board on remuneration packages, including all the components described above, as well as 
reviewing the criteria for allocation of remuneration packages.  
There are essentially two views to define the remuneration package: 
 Market-based mechanism - the level of remuneration and incentives is set based on 
benchmarking (e.g. market signalling) and must be approved internally by the 
remuneration committee to safeguard misalignments in favour of the manager; 
 Self-service approach – for reasons inherent in the management of their own image, 
managers may attempt to condition/increase their remuneration packages (e.g. use of 
company jets, firm’s credit card, ...). 
In Portugal, as mentioned by the “Código das Sociedades Comerciais (article 399º)”, fixing 
the manager’s compensation should be in the field of influence (or a competence) of the 
Shareholders General Meeting or a commission named by it for this purpose, and 
subsequently subject to its approval. 
In firms with a two-tier model, this same competence fits the powers of the General Council 
or Supervisory Board or the committee appointed by it. If the articles of association set it, this 
falls under the General Assembly competence or in a committee appointed by it (as defined in 
art. 429º CSC). 
Also under Articles 319, n.1 and 320
th
 n.1 of the Código das Sociedades Comerciais, the 
allocation of share purchase plans (when involving treasury shares) must be decided by the 
Shareholders General Meeting. 
Onward will be transcribed examples of the most relevant transposition of EU directives, 
Portuguese national laws relating to the theme, Bank of Portugal notices, among others. 
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The Directive 2010/76 of the European Union addresses the issue of remuneration from the 
perspective of excessive risk-taking. Thus, the Directive indicates that "Excessive and 
imprudent risk-taking in the banking sector has led to the failure of individual financial 
institutions and systemic problems in Member States and globally. (…) Remuneration policies 
which give incentives to take risks that exceed the general level of risk tolerated by the 
institution can undermine sound and effective risk management and exacerbate excessive 
risk-taking behaviour. (…) 
Therefore it "requires credit institutions to have arrangements, strategies, processes and 
mechanisms to manage the risks to which they are exposed." 
It also recommends the creation of mechanisms that act in pay to avoid excessive risk-taking, 
as well as firm’s internal mechanisms of checks and balances (e.g. remuneration committee, 
limiting the weight of the variable compensation in total compensation, annual and 
multiannual performance evaluations, principles of say on pay, ...) as well as external (e.g. 
disclosure and transparency of information, establishment of mechanisms of enforcement and 
monitoring for the national authorities, among others). 
On the other hand, notices from the Bank of Portugal, are built upon an approach of comply 
or explain different from EU Directives. The Notice of Bank of Portugal No 10/2011, this 
concept refers precisely: 
"In this context, the Bank of Portugal published in early 2010, Notice No. 1/2010 and 
Circular Letter No. 2/2010 / DSB, focusing on two distinct domains of the remuneration 
policy of the institutions subject to its supervision. On one hand, the Notice defines a set of 
mandatory rules on the disclosure of information relating to remuneration policy and, on the 
other hand, the aforesaid Circular Letter defined several recommendations to adopt a 
perspective of "comply or explain" about the remuneration policy of the members of the 
administrative and supervisory bodies. 
These requirements complemented the duties established in Law 28/2009, June 19
th
." 
"It was later published Directive 2010/76 / EU of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, imposing new requirements for credit institutions and investment firms to require the 
adoption of remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with sound and prudent 
risk management in order to ensure that the remuneration structure does not encourage 
excessive risk-taking and are consistent with the long-term interests of the credit institutions." 
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 "Therefore, this notice updates the rules on general principles on remuneration policies and 
practices in order to ensure that the remuneration structure does not encourage excessive and 
imprudent risk taking and is compatible with the long-term interests of institutions, and 
defines the requirements for disclosure of information required in this field, revoking the 
Notice of Banco de Portugal No 1/2010 and Circular Letter No. 2/2010 / DSB." 
 "This notice regulates the principles and rules which should govern the remuneration policy 
of credit institutions, investment firms and branches in Portugal of credit institutions and 
investment firms based outside the European Union, hereinafter referred to as institutions. 
2 - This Notice also sets out the duties of disclosure of the remuneration of the members of the 
administrative and supervisory institutions policy and their employees who, even though are 
not members of those bodies, comply with any of the following criteria: 
a) Performing duties with responsibility for risk-taking on behalf of the institution or its 
clients with a material impact on the risk profile of the institution; 
b) Total compensation places them on the same level of remuneration that members of the 
administrative or supervisory board; or  
c) carry out control functions set out in the Notice of Banco de Portugal No 5/2008."
3
 
Regarding other Portuguese entities who address the issue of compensation, the Decree of 
Portugal’s Republic President No. 57/2011 "aims, firstly, to impose new requirements for 
credit institutions and investment firms, to require the adoption of compensation policies and 
practices that are consistent with a sound and prudent risk management. 
For this reason, to ensure that the pay structure of employees whose activities have a 
significant impact on the risk profile of the institution does not encourage excessive risk-
taking and are consistent with the long-term interests of credit institutions, this law specifies 
some general principles on remuneration policies for those employees. 
The establishment of such principles is not intended to prescribe the amount and form of 
compensation to the extent that the definition and implementation of the remuneration policy 
remain with the institutions competing at the Bank of Portugal supervision of such policies. 
                                                     
3
 Translated from Portuguese by the thesis author 
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Still within the specification of the remuneration principles in order to minimize incentives for 
excessive risk-taking sets was found that the variable component of remuneration of 
employees alluded should be a balanced proportion of total remuneration, institutions should 
ensure that the total variable remuneration does not limit their ability to strengthen its capital 
base. 
Additionally, to ensure adequate transparency of remuneration structures and the associated 
risk, it is also determined that credit institutions and investment firms should disclose detailed 
information on their remuneration policies and practices." 
4
 
 Additionally, Portuguese law n.28/2009, "establishes the rules for approval and disclosure of 
the remuneration of the members of the administrative and supervisory bodies of public 
policy and revise the sanctions regime for the financial sector in criminal and administrative 
offenses. 
Defines the procedures for the approval and disclosure of the remuneration policy and the 
penalties for not complying with the defined policies."
5
 
This law also defines the duty of submission to the Shareholders General Meeting of a 
statement on the remuneration policy of the management members as well as the duty of 
annual public disclosure of the amount of remuneration paid on individual and in an aggregate 
basis. 
  
                                                     
4
 Translated from Portuguese by the thesis author 
5
 Translated from Portuguese by the thesis author 
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Optimal compensation level 
Identify an optimal level of compensation is understandably difficult, given the mix of 
incentives that can be used, as well as variables that can and should be used to set the level of 
remuneration (e.g. time period, degree of immediacy of compensation, ...). 
Additionally, the same level of compensation package for different CEO’s can be perceived 
differently (overpaid or underpaid) and may not be in accordance with desired by the 
shareholder without voting rights. Core and Guay (1999) address the issue of compensation 
and the benchmark required for the attempt with a high degree of difficulty in finding an 
optimal level of incentives and hence the remuneration. 
Using the different components in optimal hiring 
As Core, Guay and Verrecchia (1999) report, it is important to consider all components of the 
CEO compensation in an optimal contract. This conclusion is precisely demonstrated by 
Lambert and Larcker (1987) in measuring the weight of the salary and bonus in the overall 
annual compensation of CEOs of large firms from the US, measuring it within the range of 
80-90% in the 80 versus Hall and Liebman (1998) placing it in 52% in 1994. This is 
explained by the growing importance of the annual payment in stock options in total CEO 
compensation. 
Banker and Datar (1989) also report that, in contracting, the company should hire optimally, 
i.e., the contract between the firm and CEO includes compensation and penalties necessary to 
drive for the performance desired, motivating risk averse behaviours and pro-activity in the 
decision making process of the CEO in order to increase the average value of the company. 
According to Hall and Liebman (1998) CEOs are motivated by changes in all sources of their 
wealth, not only of his annual payment expressed in fixed and variable components, but also 
the wealth component, which provides substantial incentives to increase the stock price. Also 
according to Core and Guay (1999) an increase in equity-based incentives is a major reason 
for the CEO to receive shares and options forcing the appearance of vesting periods in order 
to retain the incentives. 
  
CEO COMPENSATION AS A MECHANISM TO INDUCE FIRM PERFORMANCE 
22 
 
3.4. THEORIES FOR PERFORMANCE VARIABLES DEFINITION 
According to Bodie, Kane and Marcus – Investments (2010), the profitability measures that 
better enable comparability between sectors are Return on Equity (hereinafter ROE) and 
Return on Assets (ROA hereinafter).  
The ROE measures the return for shareholders regarding capital invested in the firm through 
the ratio net income/book value of equity, while the difference for ROA lies only in the 
denominator (net income divided by total assets). 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑛 =
𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛




𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑛
 
As these measures are expressed in percentages they allow quick comparison between sectors 
and firms. 
However, there are a number of factors that influence these measures of profitability of the 
firm (e.g. funding policies, accounting classification criteria, investments, ...). 
As an example, the financing policy of a firm can influence the return (measured by ROE or 
ROA, since it is possible to influence the net income of the company by increasing debt). It 
should also be mentioned that a policy of aggressive financing increases the risk of the 
investor. 
Decomposing ROE by Dupont analysis, this ratio can be the result of numerous factors, from 
tax, financing policy, the company's operation and efficiency of the use of company assets to 
generate results: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑛 = 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑛 × 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑛 × 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝑛 × 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑛 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛 
  
Eventually, it is possible to calculate ROA from ROE: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑛 = 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑛 × 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐵𝑢𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑛 × 𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝑛 × 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑛 
 given,    
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑛 = 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛 × 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛 













Thus, the first factor measures the operating margin resulting from the company's core 
business while the second factor measures the degree of efficiency in the company's assets 
generating sales. These two ratios parcels of ROA do not depend on the financing policy of 
the firm. 
ROA addresses the question of management, i.e., the higher the ROA the better the 
management. However, the more capital intensive the firm becomes more difficult to achieve 
a high ROA, so it is also necessary to examine with caution this indicator. The difference 
between a capital intensive business and a service business is essentially based on the fact that 
in case of default of both, an only capital intensive company can more easily convert assets 
into cash which, ultimately, provides for payment to creditors. 
While ROA focuses on total assets and, therefore, includes components such as receivables 
and deposits, is a ratio that is more appealing to managers than to shareholders. The latter are 
show greater interest for the return on capital invested in the firm, focusing its analysis on the 
ROE. 
Both indicators are easily used to compare the company against its primary competitors and 
therefore beyond the internal analysis on the company that generate, they also serve as a 
benchmark to guide the management team and shareholders in positioning the company 
against its peers. 
This thesis follows Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1998) assumptions regarding the 
measurement of business performance through variable Return on Assets (measured by the 









The scope of the thesis focuses on identifying/testing the existence of a relationship between 
compensation paid and the performance of firms. Previously it was identified that the 
mechanism of compensation stems from the process of hiring a manager, a process that 
theoretically should minimize (eliminate at most) the agency problem. 
Thus, reminding the introduction chapter, the first hypothesis precisely aims to address the 
relationship between compensation and performance of the firms: 
 Hypothesis #1: There is a statistically significant relationship between performance of 
firms and the compensation of the CEO 
Additionally, if there is a statistically significant relationship, it is intended to further test the 
following additional hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis #2: The higher the weight of the variable parcel in total compensation in 
total compensation earned by the CEO the better the performance of firms.  
4.2. METHODOLOGY USED FOR DATA ANALYSIS AND TESTING 
The methodology designed to test the hypothesis is comprised of 7 steps. 
 
Figure 3 – Methodology used 
Steps V and VI are optional and will only be used if the results derived from model testing 
(step IV) result in statistical insignificance of the model.  
4.3. SCOPE DEFINITION 
The universe of analysis focuses on firms that make up the “PSI Geral” index.  
Number Equity title Designation 
1 ALTR PL Altri 
2 BANIF PL Banif 
3 BCP PL Millennium BCP 
4 BES PL Banco Espírito Santo 
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6 CFN PL Cofina 
7 COMAE PL Compta 
8 COR PL Corticeira Amorim 
9 CPR PL Cimport 
10 EDP PL EDP – Energias de Portugal 
11 EDPR PL EDP Renováveis 
12 EGL PL Mota Engil 
13 ESF PL Espírito Santo Financial Group 
14 ESO PL Estoril Sol SGPS 
15 FCP PL Futebol Clube do Porto 
16 GALP PL Galp 
17 GLINT PL Glintt 
18 GPA PL Imobiliária Construtora Grão Pará 
19 IBS PL Ibersol SGPS S.A. 
20 INA PL INAPA 
21 IPR PL Impresa 
22 JMT PL Jerónimo Martins 
23 LIG PL Lisgráfica 
24 MAR PL Martifer 
25 MCP PL Media Capital 
26 NBA PL Novabase 
27 ORE PL Orey 
28 PTC PL Portugal Telecom 
29 PTI PL Portucel 
30 RAM PL F. Ramada Investimentos 
31 RED PL Reditus 
32 RENE PL REN 
33 SCOAE PL Soares da Costa 
34 SCP PL Sporting Clube de Portugal 
35 SCT PL Toyota Caetano Portugal 
36 SEM PL Semapa 
37 SLBEN PL Sport Lisboa e Benfica 
38 SNC PL Sonaecom 
39 SON PL Sonae 
40 SONC PL Sonae Capital 
41 SONI PL Sonae Indústria 
42 SUCO PL Sumol Compal 
43 SVA PL SAG Gest 
44 TDSA PL Teixeira Duarte 
45 VAF PL Vista Alegre 
46 ZON PL ZON 
Table 3 – Scope of firms analysed 
The argument for choosing this set of firms is based on the greater availability of 
disaggregated information regarding compensation paid to the CEO in the respective 
management reports or Corporate Governance reports available.  
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It seems, however, that it is only after 2008, for the vast majority of firms in the list above, 
that the information relating to the compensation of the CEO is broke down from the block 
"compensation of the Board of Directors" or "compensation of Executive Committee"- based 
on the governance model chosen. Therefore, only after 2008 it is possible to compile 
information on the CEO compensation individually. This breakdown stems from the adoption 
of firms regarding Law n.28/2009 as previously shown. 
Thus, it can also be concluded that the time interval of the data compiled regards the period 
2008-2013, comprising years of Portuguese crisis. It is, therefore possible, that the 
performance of firms is possibly influenced by factors external to the same. 
If we look at the firms from a sector point of view for the 2008 - 2013 period, it is possible to 
find that some sectors were top performers (communications, retail, and energy) throughout 
the crisis and somewhat indifferent. As expected, real estate and construction are on the 






# of firms 
(#) 
Communications 
Media 0,22 18,8 3 
Telecom 4,63 28,7 3 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
Distributors – Discretionary -0,12 -0,31 1 
Gaming, Lodging & Restaurants 1,51 3,21 2 
Home & Office Products -3,37 -3,65 2 
Recreation Facilities & Svcs -8,04 N/A 3 
Retail - Discretionary -0,22 -12,1 3 
Consumer 
Staples 
Retail - Consumer Staples 4,39 20,37 2 
Energy Oil, Gas & Coal 3,47 10,88 1 
Financials 
Banking 0,61 -3,06 6 
Real Estate -6,54 -21,92 1 
Industrials 
Engineering & Construction Svcs 1,49 3,32 8 
Industrial & Commercial Services 1,12 N/A 1 
Materials Construction Materials 0,00 -7,10 3 
Technology Technology Services 0,34 -16,27 4 
Utilities Utilities 2,16 9,47 3 
 
Note that some information is not available because some observations are lacking for the 
year 2008. Simple average is used for ROA and ROE.  
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4.4. DATA COLLECTION METHOD 
Regarding the method of data collection, there are a set of topics that must be first addressed 
in order to properly collect and compile data. 
According to Green (1993), data sources can be broken down between primary (eg. 
Questionnaires, interviews, observation and focus groups) and secondary (statistics, 
databases, economic indicators, ...). The definition of a secondary data source comes from the 
fact that the appraiser is not responsible for collecting and compiling the data directly (as 
opposed to primary data source, i.e., that are generated by the evaluation itself). 
In this thesis, secondary data sources (Bloomberg, historical data for stock value compiled 
from bolsapt.com website, direct collection of data in the reports of Government and 
Management offered by several firms) were used. A database regarding the performance of 
firms and the remuneration of the CEO on an annual basis in particular, "Return on Assets", 
"Return on Equity" and "Compensation of the CEO", hereinafter referred to as ROA, ROE 
and Remuneration respectively, has been compiled, as well as regarding other control 
variables. 
 
4.5. DEFINITION OF THE STUDY VARIABLES 
The variables Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) were defined according 
to the literature previously detailed. Note the definition of Bloomberg for these variables. 
According to the definition, some of the observations made in the compilation, cannot be 
presented. 
For Return on Equity, according to Bloomberg: 
 “Stocks and Industrial Securities 
o The Return on equity (in percentage) is calculated as the net income of 12 
consecutive months (loss) less preferred dividends for 12 consecutive months 
box, divided by the average of total common equity, multiplied by 100. 
o Total common equity = Total Capital stock and additional paid-in capital + 
Retained earnings 
o Additional paid Capital = Premium on issue of shares 
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o The average refers to the average of the beginning balance and the ending 
balance 
o If the initial or final common equity is negative, the ROE will not be calculated 
 Banks 
o The Return on equity (in percentage) is calculated as the net income of 12 
consecutive months (loss) less preferred dividends for 12 consecutive months 
box, divided by average total common equity, multiplied by 100 
o Total common equity = Total Capital stock and additional paid-in capital + 
Retained earnings 
o Additional paid Capital = Premium on issue of shares 
o The average refers to the average of the beginning balance and the ending 
balance 
o If the initial or final common equity is negative, the ROE will not be calculated 
 Financial services 
o The Return on equity (in percentage) is calculated as the net income of 12 
consecutive months (loss) less preferred dividends for 12 consecutive months 
box, divided by average total common equity, multiplied by 100 
o Total common equity = Total Capital stock and additional paid-in capital + 
Retained earnings 
o Additional paid Capital = Premium on issue of shares 
o The average refers to the average of the beginning balance and the ending 
balance 
 Insurance 
o The Return on equity (in percentage) is calculated as net income of 12 
consecutive months (loss) less preferred dividends for 12 consecutive months 
box, plus the surplus of policyholders of 12 consecutive months divided by 
average total assets common, multiplied by 100 
o Total common equity = Total Capital into shares + Additional paid in capital 
+ retained earnings + Net assets of the insured 
o Additional paid Capital = Premium on issue of shares 
o The average refers to the average of the beginning balance and the ending 
balance 
o If the initial or final common equity is negative, the ROE will not be calculated 




For  Return on Assets, from Bloomberg definition: 
 Banking / Financial / Manufacturing / Insurance / Public Services / Real Estate 
o The return of assets (ROA in percentage) is an indicator of the profitability of 
a company relative to its total assets. ROA gives an idea of management 
efficiency in using assets to generate earnings. calculated as: 
o (net revenues for the past 12M / Average total assets) * 100, where "net 
revenues for the past 12M is RR813, TRAIL_12M_NET_INC" and "Total 
assets Average" is the average of the initial and final BS035, BS_TOT_ASSET 
balance ".” 
Regarding CEO compensation, the measure of CEO total compensation used is similar to the 
one used by Antle and Smith (1986), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Hall and Liebman (1998) 
and Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1998). The total compensation of the CEO is then divided 
into three components, namely: 
 Fixed: the fixed compensation earned in the year; 
 Variable: i) variable compensation for the year in question and paid in the current 
year, ii) bonuses granted in the year and paid in the same year, iii) shares and bonds 
paid in the year (which may have been granted in previous years and usually 
discriminated against the value given in payment), iv) other variable remuneration 
awarded in previous years (but paid in the current year); 
 Wealth: variation of the equity value of the CEO firm’s portfolio expressed by the 
total number of shares multiplied by current value when reported, options and bonds 
fairly valued at price reported in management report; 
This type of variable, composed of a broad range of components allows the identification of 
changes in the wealth of the CEO on an annual basis, regarding total payments made by the 
firm. Other changes in the CEO portfolio not directly linked to the firm were not accounted 
for. 
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Thus, the total compensation is the sum of the change (positive or negative) in the various 
identified components.  
This variable provides a broader view of the total compensation (which has not been 
traditionally used in academic literature as explained Abowd and Kaplan (1999)). However, 
as Core, Guay and Verrecchia (1999) report, it is important to consider all components of the 
remuneration of the CEO since there are many other components that are incorporated in the 
optimal contract between the shareholder and the CEO, other than base salary and bonus. In 
fact, the weight of base salary and bonus is being reduced in overall compensation as it is 
demonstrated by Lambert and Larcker (1987), which measured the weight of the salary and 
bonus in the overall annual compensation of CEOs of large firms from the US, placing it 
within the range of 80-90% in the 80 versus Hall and Liebman (1998) placing the same 
weight by about 52% in 1994. 
Banker and Datar (1989) also report that, in contracting, the company should hire optimally, 
i.e., the contract between the firm and CEO includes compensation and penalties necessary to 
drive for the performance desired, motivating risk averse behaviours and pro-activity in the 
decision making process of the CEO in order to increase the average value of the company. 
According to Hall and Liebman (1998) CEOs are motivated by changes in all sources of their 
wealth, not only of his annual payment expressed in fixed and variable components, but also 
the wealth component, which provides substantial incentives to increase the stock price. Also 
according to Core and Guay (1999) an increase in equity-based incentives is a major reason 
for the CEO to receive shares and options forcing the appearance of vesting periods in order 
to retain the incentives. 
  
CEO COMPENSATION AS A MECHANISM TO INDUCE FIRM PERFORMANCE 
31 
 
4.6. COLLECTED DATA ANALYSIS 
Regarding the ROE variable, 243 observations were collected, having been observed the 
following descriptive statistics: 
 
Figure 4 – ROE descriptive statistics 
To be noted that such distribution is more concentrated than a normal distribution. It is 
possible to conclude that the probability function is leptokurtic, namely that the distribution 
has heavy tails. Likewise, looking at Jarque-Bera it is possible to conclude that, since the 
value of JB is high, we accept the hypothesis of normal distribution of random errors. 




Figure 5 – Graphical representation of the behaviour of ROE for each of the firms 
The graphical representation of the behaviour of the ROE variable does not show a clear 
pattern between the various firms, although there are some firms that behave more differently 
from the average than others. 
 
Figure 6 – Graphical representation of the global trend of ROE 
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ROE variable autocorrelation is positive [0.013 – 0.424] for all 5 lags. The average of the 
autocorrelation is 0,1618. The trend (as expected) is the reduction of the autocorrelation along 
the 5 lags. 
 
Figure 7 – Autocorrelation of ROE 
Regarding the ROA variable, 269 observations were collected, having been observed the 
following descriptive statistics: 
 
Figure 8 – ROA descriptive statistics 
To be noted that such distribution is more concentrated than a normal distribution. It is 
possible to conclude that the probability function is leptokurtic, namely that the distribution 
has heavy tails. Likewise, looking at Jarque-Bera it is possible to conclude that, since the 
value of JB is high, we accept the hypothesis of normal distribution of random errors. 
 




Figure 9 – Graphical representation of the behaviour of ROA for each of the firms  
The graphical representation of the behaviour of the ROA variable does not show a clear 
pattern between the various firms, although there are some firms that behave more differently 
from the average. 
 
Figure 10 – Graphical representation of the global trend of ROA 
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ROA variable autocorrelation has no clearly defined signal [-0.165 – 0.132] for all 5 lags. The 
autocorrelation average is 0,0022. There is no clear trend regarding the reduction of 
autocorrelation, as in lags 2, 4 e 5 the autocorrelation is negative and in the remaining lags is 
positive. 
 
Figure 11 – ROA autocorrelation 
Regarding the Total Pay variable, 222 observations were collected, having been observed the 
following descriptive statistics: 
 
Figure 12 – Total Pay descriptive statistics 
On average, for the time interval analysed, total pay is around 180.000€. Standard deviation is 
very high. Regarding kurtosis, to be noted that such distribution is more concentrated than a 
normal distribution, and so, it is possible to conclude that the probability function is 
leptokurtic, namely that the distribution has heavy tails. Likewise, looking at Jarque-Bera it is 
possible to conclude that, since the value of JB is high, we accept the hypothesis of normal 
distribution of random errors. 




Figure 13 – Graphical representation of the behaviour of Total Pay for each of the firms 
The graphical representation of the behaviour of the Total Pay variable also demonstrates the 
lack of a clear pattern between the various firms. 
 
Figure 14 – Graphical representation of the global trend of Total Pay 
Total pay autocorrelation, does not present a clear trend sign [-0.452 – 0.126] for all 5 lags. 
Autocorrelation average is -0,29. There is no clear trend regarding the reduction of 
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autocorrelation, as in lags 1 and 2 the autocorrelation is negative and in the remaining lags is 
positive. 
 
Figure 15 – Total Pay autocorrelation 
Note the omitted data in some of the listed firms on the various variables. This happens by 
lack of information available (e.g., there are no observations available on reports regarding 
the firm "Espírito Santo Financial Group" in the variable Total Pay), but also by the very 
definition of the variables according to the Bloomberg on "ROA" and "ROE", mentioned 
above. 
The variable "Total Pay" includes equity component, as previously defined. Nevertheless, this 
component does not include dividends paid to shareholders.  
The stock valuation held by the CEO (acquired or offered as compensation) was carried out 
by collecting the last share price at the year in question from historical data from BolsaPT
6
 
website. This also equals the last position reported by the company in relation to its 
shareholders and, as so, it is solid valuation of the total portfolio reported by the CEO.  
Measuring a point in time avoids the constant variations of the value of the portfolio over the 
period of one year and, therefore, it was possible to control the downside of measurement 
caused by changes in the portfolio of the CEO during the year by sales orders, purchase of 
shares, options exercise, etc.  
Analysing the data collected regarding CEO compensation, one can see that the use of stock 
options and other incentives is not common among the list of Portuguese firms. Several yearly 
management reports only state, during the period, that the CEO only collected a fixed base 
salary with no incentives and no bonus. It is also not widely common, an implemented 
                                                     
6
 www.bolsapt.com 
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mechanism to defer payments of bonus. There are also a several number of cases of which the 
CEO possesses no equity of the firm, which once again, is a mechanism commonly used in 
other markets to align shareholder value with CEO compensation. 
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4.7. MODEL CONSTRUCTION 
Panel Data: Balanced panel data versus non balanced panel data  
Following Park (2009), panel data are structured units, relating to individuals or businesses 
relating to a certain predefined time period. Thus it is possible to combine two dimensions, 
namely units and time.  
In a balanced panel data, the number of periods (T) is equal to the same number of individuals 
(i). Conversely, if this equality is not respected, we are in presence of an unbalanced panel 
data. It is always desirable to obtain an equal number of observations in each subclass, as 
working with unbalanced data is much more complex and difficult to analyse and interpret. 
In reality, most common panels are unbalanced due to a number of reasons. A common case 
for unbalanced panel data is the exclusion of observations with defects or by simple 
availability of information, which then originates different sample sizes in different groups. A 
practical example of this case relates to the Espirito Santo Financial Group whose lack of 
detailed information regarding CEO compensation requires the elimination of observations on 
the same. Another common case is linked precisely by the absence of data in ROA and ROE 
variables in some years for some firms, precisely for the reasons stated above by Bloomberg 
in its definition of the variables.  
Thus, it is easily concluded that, despite the attempts to maintain a balanced panel, as it has 
been impossible to achieve so. Therefore the panel data to be used is unbalanced. 
Still on data collection, according to Cameron and Trivedi - Microeconometrics using Stata 
(2010), panel data can be short (small number of periods and high number of individuals) or 
long (high number of periods and low number of individuals) or both (high number of periods 
and subjects). In this particular case, the panel type is short, since data only comprises 6 years 
(2008 - 2013) and 46 subjects.  
To estimate the models with panel data there are several possible structures:  
 By means of pooled regressions, where the individual effect is constant. Then 
Ordinary Least Squares provides consistent and efficient estimates of the common α 
and the slope vector β; 
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 By means of dynamic models, also fixed effects and random effects. The difference 
lies whether the individual effect is correlated or not with the included variables. 
 By means of random parameters, the random effects model can be viewed as a 
regression model with a random constant term. 
The chosen models for the thesis were the dynamic models, namely fixed and random effects. 
For an analysis regarding the different types of models please see the appendixes. 
4.8. RESULTS: LINKING PERFORMANCE AND COMPENSATION WITHOUT CONTROL VARIABLES 
Recalling the hypothesis previously stated, the intent of the thesis is to test the existence of a 
statistically significant link between performance and remuneration. The linearly-defined 
model for both the performance variables is: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑡 
Thus, regarding the first hypothesis “Hypothesis #1: There is a statistically significant 
relationship between performance of firms and the compensation of the CEO” 
 The null hypothesis (H0) is there is a statistically significant relationship between 
performance of firms and the compensation of the CEO 
 The alternate hypothesis (H1) is there is no statistically significant relationship 







ROA TOTAL PAY (+) TOTAL PAY (+) 
ROE TOTAL PAY (+) TOTAL PAY (+) 
 
Table 4 – Fixed and random effects model expected signs 
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Additionally, if there is a statistically significant relationship, it is intended to further test the 
following additional “Hypothesis #2: The higher the weight of the variable parcel in total 
compensation in total compensation earned by the CEO the better the performance of firms.”  
Therefore for this subtype, the null and the alternate hypothesis are: 
 Null hypothesis (H0): The higher the percentage of variable compensation in the total 
compensation package earned by the CEO the better is the firm performance.  
 The alternate hypothesis (H1): The higher the percentage of variable compensation in 
the total compensation package earned by the CEO the worst or null impact it has in 






ROA TOTAL PAY (+) TOTAL PAY (+) 
ROE TOTAL PAY (+) TOTAL PAY (+) 
 
Table 5 – Fixed and random effects model expected signs 
 
For hypothesis #1, the fixed and random models built were: 
Variable Fixed effects Random effects 
ROA 
ROA = C(1)*TOTALPAY + C(2) + [CX=F], 
with substituted coefficients ROA = 
9.02898001724e-09*TOTALPAY + 
0.811892659666 + [CX=F] 
ROA = C(1)*TOTALPAY + C(2) + [CX=R], 
with substituted coefficients ROA = 
1.89996808069e-08*TOTALPAY + 
0.810015424082 + [CX=R] 
ROE 
ROE = C(1)*TOTALPAY + C(2) + [CX=F], 
with substituted coefficients  
ROE = 4.67833517666e-08*TOTALPAY + 
3.51081386919 + [CX=F] 
ROE = C(1)*TOTALPAY + C(2) + [CX=R], 
with substituted coefficients ROE = 
5.29124616936e-08*TOTALPAY + 
3.29127861169 + [CX=R] 
 
Table 6 – Fixed and random effects modelling 
 




Figure 16 – Estimation output for ROA fixed effects model 
  
 
Figure 17 – Estimation output for ROE fixed effects model  
 




Figure 18 – Estimation output for ROA random effects model  
 




Figure 19 – Estimation output for ROE random effects model  
 
Thus, to determine which model should be most suited to be used to study the regression, the 
Hausman test was used. The test allows checking which of the two models (fixed effects vs 
random effects) is the most appropriate according to Hausman (1978). 




Figure 20 – Hausman test results for ROE 
For the ROE model, as the Chi-Square statistic is 0.313463 and the probability is 57,56% (as 
so, above 5%), it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis, and therefore the most 
appropriate model is the random effects model.  
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For the ROA model, as the Chi-Square statistic is 0.805420 and the probability is 36,95% (as 
so, above 5%), it is also not possible to reject the null hypothesis, and therefore the most 
appropriate model is the random effects model. 
 
Figure 21 – Hausman test results for ROA 
 
As result of the Hausman test, the focus from now on will be on the random effects models 
for ROA and ROE. Remembering the estimation outputs for both of the models:  
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Total pay coefficient 1.89996808069e-08 5.29124616936e-08 
t-statistic for the Total pay coefficient 0.502757 0.659150 
Probability for the Total pay 
coefficient 
0.6157 0.5106 
R-squared  0.001194 0.002198 
Table 7 – Main outputs for both the random and fixed effects models 
 
Looking at R-squared, it is observable that the explanatory power of both the models is very 
low (less than 1%). It is also observable, referring to the probability for the Total Pay 
coefficient, that its value is very high – 61,57% and 51,06% - both above 5%, which means 
the coefficient has no statistical validity. 
This can be thoroughly tested performing a Wald test on the coefficient, where the null 
hypothesis is if Total Pay coefficient is zero [H0: C(1) = 0]. 
 
Figure 22 – Wald test results for the Total Pay Coefficient in the ROA model 
 
CEO COMPENSATION AS A MECHANISM TO INDUCE FIRM PERFORMANCE 
48 
 
Looking at the results of the test, particularly the probability value of the t-statistic, the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected, which means there is probably no link between the total pay 
independent variable and the dependent ROA variable. 
The same test and conclusion can also be demonstrated for the ROE model, as shown in the 
picture below. 
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4.9. RESULTS: LINKING PERFORMANCE AND COMPENSATION WITH CONTROL VARIABLES 
It is also important to perform other sensitivity analysis as well as tests to try to null other 
noises exogenous to the variables which might be affecting the model. 
Therefore, in order to accomplish the sensitivity analysis, other control variables as well as 
performing small sample analysis will be introduced. This is valid for all firms (large sample) 
and for the top 15 firm performers (small sample), both for the ROA and ROE models. The 
top 15 firm performers for ROA and ROE were: 
Model List of firms 
ROA 
 Portugal Telecom, Jerónimo Martins, Portucel, Orey, Ibersol, Novabase, GALP, Corticeira 
Amorim, Semapa, Media Capital, REN, Sonaecom, EDP, Altri, F. Ramada Investimentos; 
ROE 
 Portugal Telecom, Cofina, Jerónimo Martins, Futebol Clube do Porto, Altri, Orey, ZON, 
EDP, Semapa, Mota Engil, Portucel, REN, GALP, Ibersol, F. Ramada Investimentos; 
 
Table 8 – Top 15 performers 
The additional control variables included were related to i) the firm corporate governance 
(TYPEOFBOARD – identifies if the board is unitary or two tier, PERCENTNONEXECDIR 
– identifies the percentage of non-executive directors on the board, 
PERCINDDIRETCOMPCO – identifies the percentage of independent directors on the 
compensation committee, OUTSIDECOMPADVISO – identifies if there are known outside 
advisors on the firm’s compensation committee and APPOINTFROMWITHIN -  detects if 
the CEO was appointed from within the firm) but ii) also in close link to economic 
performance, a set of firm level controls (ASSETGROWTH – compiles information regarding 
the firm’s asset growth, BOOKVALUEPERSHARE – compiles data regarding the book value 
per share). 
APPOINTFROMWITHIN, OUTSIDECOMPADVISO and TYPEOFBOARD are all three 
dummy variables. All the data for the control variables introduced was also extracted and 
compiled from Bloomberg, as well. 
As a summary, the table below presents the results for all the analysis performed crossing the 
introduction of both the control variables as well as the small sample analysis. 









 Total pay coefficient non statistically 
relevant (p-value above 5%) 
 Low explanatory power of the model 
(R squared is 0,1%) 
 Total pay coefficient non statistically 
relevant (p-value above 5%) 
 High R2 due to number of observations 
and introduction of control variables 
ROE 
 Total pay coefficient non statistically 
relevant (p-value above 5%) 
 Low explanatory power of the model 
(R squared is 0,2%) 
 Total pay coefficient non statistically 
relevant (p-value above 5%) 
 Medium/low R2 due to number of 





 Total pay coefficient non statistically 
relevant (p-value above 5%) 
 Low explanatory power of the model 
(R squared is 0,03%) 
 Total pay coefficient non statistically 
relevant (p-value above 5%) 
 Medium/low R2 due to number of 
observations and introduction of control 
variables 
ROE 
 Total pay coefficient non statistically 
relevant (p-value above 5%) 
 Low explanatory power of the model 
(R squared is 0,03%) 
 Total pay coefficient non statistically 
relevant (p-value above 5%) 
 Medium/low R2 due to number of 
observations and introduction of control 
variables 
Table 9 – Summary of conclusions 




Figure 24 – ROA model, large sample with introduction of control variables 
 




Figure 25 – ROE model, large sample with introduction of control variables 
 




Figure 26 – ROA model, small sample analysis 




Figure 27 – ROE model, small sample analysis 




Figure 28 – ROA model, small sample analysis with control variables (best case scenario) 




Figure 29 – ROE model, small sample analysis with control variables (best case scenario) 
On these top tier performance firms, some additional tests were performed to factor in other 
variables like PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN CAPITAL (in order to check if firms with 
higher degrees of foreign ownership percentage produce better performance) and 
PERCENTAGE OF CEO OWNERSHIP (percentage of equity owned by the CEO). 
Theoretically, these variables should account for some degree of relationship with 
performance. The assumption here is that international shareholders demand for higher 
performance nevertheless other issues regarding national market performance. The next 
assumption here is that whenever CEO equity ownership is higher the better the performance 
of the company, as there is more incentive for the firm to produce results and reward the 
CEO, which is also a relevant shareholder. 
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Nevertheless, as shown by the figures below, no significant statistical relationship can be 
established between either of these variables and performance variables. R
2
 is low and the β 
coefficient of the regression is not statistically relevant. 
 
Figure 30 – ROA model and percentage of foreign owned equity (best performant firms) 




Figure 31 – ROA model and percentage of equity owned by the CEO (best performant firms) 
 
Figure 32 – ROE model and percentage of foreign owned equity (best performant firms) 




Figure 33 – ROE model and percentage of equity owned by the CEO (best performant firms) 
Note that all the regressions were performed using information collected from CMVM and 
governance reports. Fixed effects models were also built but the random effects models, 
which was still the most suited model/ best fit regressions, is presented (as designated by the 
Hausman Test). Wald tests for the β coefficients were also performed and the results showed 
that there is no relation between variables. 





The main purpose of this study is to examine whether the total compensation paid to CEOs in 
Portuguese firms explains its performance. 
Recalling the hypothesis previously stated, the intent of the thesis is to test the existence of a 
statistically significant link between performance and remuneration. The linearly-defined 
model for both the performance variables is: 
𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑡 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 =∝ +𝛽 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑖𝑡 +∈𝑖𝑡 
Recalling what was previously written, the first hypothesis was “Hypothesis #1: There is a 
statistically significant relationship between performance of firms and the compensation of 
the CEO” 
Additionally, if there was a statistically significant relationship, it was intended to further test 
the following additional “Hypothesis #2: The higher the weight of the variable parcel in total 
compensation in total compensation earned by the CEO the better the performance of firms.”  
Based on the analysis performed, it seems that CEO compensation does not induce firm 
performance, and therefore hypothesis #1 is not corroborated, which means there is no 
statistically valid link between performance and CEO compensation, i.e., results suggest that 
managerial compensation that are meant to align managerial interests with shareholder value, 
do not necessarily translate into performance of the firms. 
This is an expected result, even when it is based on the most statistical “loose” case, without 
any control variables. Recalling the Introduction chapter, one of the common sense 
explanations for the lack of performance was risk aversion. This risk aversion explains the 
preference for “fixed pay” over performance pay in many cases.  
Even when pushing for results and trying to study if the link was being affected by the 
economic Portuguese crisis, introducing control variables and small sampling (only the top 15 
performers), it still was not possible to statistically create a valid link between performance 
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variables and CEO compensation. The small sample analysis is also valid to study if CEO 
compensation was hurt by the economic crisis, which, if looking at this from a capping 
perspective, CEO compensation is always low capped as there are not enough “whips” in the 
incentives to punish bad performance. Therefore small sampling allows for establishing a 
proxy to this matter and still no link was found (other conclusion detailed below also looks at 
the economic crisis from another perspective as influencing CEO compensation). 
Additionally, as small sampling was introduced into the models, still no relation is possible to 
infer which means it is not possible to also conclude anything regarding hypothesis #2.  
On top of, when crunching the numbers, and looking at CEO equity ownership as a proxy for 
shareholder risk aversion one can conclude that risk aversion is a trait not limited to CEO but 
also to shareholders.  
 The risk aversion case is also present as a conclusion derived from other restriction (even 
though not tested): 
 As some specific governance variables were introduced to measure the possible 
influence of CEO on compensation (e.g. if the CEO was appointed from within its 
compensation package might be less than the market is offering, the presence of 
outside compensation advisors might positively influence the CEO compensation 
package, or even regarding the presence of a sufficient number of independent 
directors on the compensation committee or non-executive directors on the board to 
safe guarantee the implementation of checks and balances, among others) there might 
be other mechanisms through which the CEO might influence its compensation 
package (e.g. managerial power as stated by Bebchuk and Fried (2004) might be a 
valid point here as rent extraction might already be too high and therefore there are no 
incentives for risk taking decisions from the CEO which hurts firm performance); 
 Given the years analysed, a recession period of the Portuguese economy, the economic 
performance of the firms might be affected by it, and as some of total pay is 
considered only on the year it has been paid and not on the year it was earned (past 
economic firm performance) this effect might influence the linear regression. This is 
also aligned with risk aversion and efficient contracting points detailed in the 
Introduction chapter, as if there are no incentives for risk taking decisions there is no 
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performance. Additionally, if rent extraction is high and there are no “whips” placed 
in the contract, risk aversion behaviour is enhanced; 
 Core, Guay and Verrecchia (1999), also state that even if contracts are optimal, 
contracting models that are based on project selection might not be well explained by 
agency theory; 
 Some of the CEO contracts currently in effect may lack an update, even though the 
CEO has been re-elected for another term (e.g. F. Ramada Investimentos, Lisgráfica, 
…); 
Analysing the data collected regarding CEO compensation, one can see that the use of stock 
options and other incentives is not common among the list of Portuguese firms. Several yearly 
management reports only state, during the period, that the CEO only collected a fixed base 
salary with no incentives and no bonus. It is also not widely common, an implemented 
mechanism to defer payments of bonus. There are also a several number of cases of which the 
CEO possesses no equity of the firm, which once again, is a mechanism to align shareholder 
value with CEO compensation. 
Looking at the literature, one can only say that the subject is controversial. Several authors 
present their case stating that CEO compensation has no relationship with firm performance. 
Contributing to this point of view, Jensen (1993) argues that boards are ineffective in setting 
the compensation for a number of reasons, among which stands out the reduced equity 
participation by the directors (executive and non-executive). 
Crystal (1991) also argues that the board is ineffective in setting the appropriate remuneration. 
The idea behind his argument is that since managers are essentially hired by the CEO, he/she 
can exert high influence on them, so when it comes for the moment of CEO compensation 
definition this influence can result in the ineffectiveness of the act. 
Additionally, Crystal (1991) also states that boards rely on external consultants for hiring the 
CEO, most of them advising also on the board or in the compensation committee, which may 
result in contracts that benefit only CEO and not the firm.  
Core, Guay and Thomas (2005), on the other hand, address the issue of pay for performance 
rebating every misconception critics pose about four major concerns: i) executive pay is too 
high; ii) CEO contracts are not aligned to increase firm value; iii) options and other equity 
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based pay do not reflect good performance; and iv) CEOs have too much freedom to unwind 
their incentives. 
Nevertheless a controversial aspect, based on the results achieved it seems that CEO 
compensation does not induce firm performance in the Portuguese listed firms. Even when 
control variables and small sampling were introduced, it was not possible to statistically 
create a valid link between performance variables and CEO compensation.   
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7.1. USED SOFTWARE FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
The software used for building the models/ regressions was EVIEWS (version 7). 
According to the software’s website, “EViews (…) offers academic researchers, 
corporations, government agencies, and students access to powerful statistical, forecasting, 
and modeling tools through an innovative, easy-to-use object-oriented interface. 
EViews blends the best of modern software technology with cutting edge features. The result 
is a state-of-the art program that offers unprecedented power within a flexible, easy-to-use 
interface. 
Explore the world of EViews and discover why it's the worldwide leader in Windows-based 
econometric software and the choice of those who demand the very best.” 
According to Agung (2008), the software is "an excellent interactive program that provides 
an excellent tool to use in order to perform data analysis, especially when it comes to 
developing and evaluating models, perform analysis of residuals and hypothesis, univariate 
or multivariate test.”  
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7.2. FIXED EFFECTS VS RANDOM EFFECTS MODELS 
According to Marques (2000), there are 7 model specifications: 
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for the variance and 
covariance matrix of 
the disturbance terms 
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and large T) 
 
Table 10 – Regression models 
The most used models for data analysis are fixed and random effects models. 
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7.3. HAUSMAN TEST SPECIFICATION 
The test is based on the premise that if on the null hypothesis covariance is equal to zero than 
we are in the presence of random effects: 
 H0: Cov (ai, Xit) = 0 (random effects model is appropriate) 
 HA: Cov (ai, Xit) ≠ 0 (fixed effects model is appropriate) 
Under the null hypothesis, the estimators of the random effects model are consistent and 
efficient. Under the alternative hypothesis, the GLS estimators with random effects (and OLS) 
are not consistent, but the estimators with fixed effects are. 
Hausman statistic is the following:  








 𝑏𝑓𝑒 is the vector of estimators of the model with fixed effects 
 𝑏𝑟𝑒 is the vector of estimators of the random effects model 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝑓𝑒) is the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators 𝑏𝑓𝑒 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑏𝑟𝑒) is the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators 𝑏𝑟𝑒 
 k is the number of regressors 
If 𝐻 > 𝜒2
𝑘
the random effects model is rejected. Therefore, the fixed effects model is the most 
appropriate.  
 
